Tag Archives: securitisation

China ‘declares war’ on pollution: what does it mean?

On 5th March, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang opened the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress. These speeches tend to be full of the usual, ‘expected’ and generally repetitive bureaucratic language. However, this time Li’s speech was a little out of the ordinary: it explicitly declared a ‘war on pollution’ – an unexpected choice of words which suggests the issue is increasingly considered one of security. This blog has already talked about China’s ‘Airpocalypse’, and whether or not deteriorating air quality should be considered a security issue. The government has been considering and implementing a range of measures to deal with urban pollution, and with up to 500,000 people dying early each year from air pollution related illnesses action is desperately needed. Li’s speech, in declaring war on pollution, took the debate to another level. Xinhua reported Li as stating that ‘Smog is affecting larger parts of China and environmental pollution has become a major problem, which is nature’s red-light warning against the model of inefficient and blind development’. Miao Xuegang, a deputy to the National People’s Congress, called Li’s declaration “a letter of commitment from the government”.

Premier Li Keqiang on March 5, from TIME

The statement is ‘the highest-level acknowledgement yet of the enormous challenges China faces’, directly recognising the seriousness of the issue. The language is reminiscent of securitization theory’s suggestion that when issues are declared issues of security and supreme priority, they can be dealt with differently – allocating extra funds and enabling emergency measures. It suggests the government is taking pollution seriously, and it will be interesting to see how far the it will take this – the Airpocalypse will likely remain a popular topic in Chinese media, and with rising numbers of environmental protests it will be difficult for the government to shirk responsibilities. The biggest obstacle, however, remains economic development. It is widely seen as the cause of China’s pollution problems, but Li’s speech also reiterated a commitment to keeping economic growth at 7.5% and it is difficult to see how this will enable a serious improvement in pollution levels. Ai Nanshan, from Sichuan University noted that “you can not get a beautiful GDP figure at the cost of environment”. This is clearly a puzzle the government has yet to solve.


Is securitisation theory dead? Thoughts from the 8th Pan European Conference in Warsaw

Having just returned from a great conference in Warsaw I feel like it’s a good time to sit down and write some thoughts down. The conference itself was very well organised – with a lot of interesting sections. Being part of the section on securitisation and politicisation, I inevitably attended quite a few panels on securitisation theory. It’s an area where a lot of interesting work is being done, but many discussions ended up in the same place – expressing increasing fatigue with securitisation theory itself. As a theory, it has been revised in so many ways that much of the work being done under the heading is unrecognisable from the original theory set out in Security: a New Framework for Analysis. Of course, this is not necessarily a bad thing – much of this work is all the better for it.

However, the endless need to revise securitisation theory to ‘fit’ an ever increasing number of empirical research areas increasingly calls into question the utility of the theory itself. As Claudia Aradau raised in one panel – perhaps it’s time to return to just looking at security practices instead? In many ways, critical work done in IR in the 1990s – pre-securitisation theory – was more rich and nuanced. David Campbell and Rob Walker come to mind, among others. While securitisation theory provides a rather neat framework for analysing how security works, with clear criteria and facilitating conditions to analyse, perhaps it’s a little too neat for actual empirical analysis. It has provided a lot of insight into how security ‘works’, but I’m increasingly sceptical of how useful it is for studying security in the real world. Perhaps it works better as a guide than a definitive theory.

In Warsaw, I heard it referred to both as ‘dead’, and as ‘passé’. Whatever your position, it is definitely increasingly contested. In my eyes, this can only be a good thing.